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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the letter from defendant Salt Lake City's

Police Chief to the plaintiff,informing him of the City's
conclusion that the event he complained of did occur,properly
received in evidence as a relevant admission by a party within
the meaning of Rules 401 and 804(D)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence?
2.

Did the City preserve as a contention of error

on appeal its objection to the receipt of the letter on the
grounds that (a) the letter is a "subsequent remedial measure"
within the meaning of Rule 407 of the Rules of Evidence;
(b) the letter is subject to the executive privilege established

by Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8, and (c) the letter's prejudicial
impact substantially outweighs its probative value within
the meaning of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence?
3.

If the letter was improperly received in evidence,

did it likely have a substantial effect on the jury's decision?
STATUTES AND RULES OF
EVIDENCE REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(5)(Supp. 1986).
Privileged Communications. There
are particular relations in
which it is the policy of the law
to encourage confidence and to
preserve it inviolate. Therefore,
a person cannot be examined as
a witness in the following cases:
* * *

(5) A public officer cannot
be examined as to communications
made to him in official confidence
when public interest would suffer
by the disclosure.
Rules 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
(2) Admission by party opponent.
The statement is offered
against a party and is (~A) his
own statement, either in his
individual or representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of
which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth,
or (C) a statement by a person
authorized by him to make a
statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by his agent or
employee, made during the

existence of the relationship;
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during
the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Relevant evidence means evidence
having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
Rule 4-03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time
or needless presentation of
cummulative evidence.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected . . .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lee Meyers brought this negligece action against
Salt Lake City for an injury he sustained when City police
officer J.R. Nelson slammed a car door on his ankle.
(Prior to trial, a second cause of action against Officer
Nelson for intentional injury was voluntarily dismissed).
A jury trial was held on October 29, 30 and 31,
1985, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

The evidence

received at trial included a letter mailed to the plaintiff
from Chief of Police Bud Willoughby and Lt. W.C. Duncan to
which the City objected.

The jury found in a special verdict

that both the plaintiff and defendant were negligent and that
their negligence jointly caused plaintiff's injury.

They

found the City to be 99% negligent in causing the injury and
the plaintiff, 1%.

The jury found special damages in the

amount of $6,740.88 lost wages, $5,221.96 medical expenses,
and $15,000 in general damages.

The award was reduced by

1% for plaintiff's negligence, and by $4,015.79 ,representing
a portion of medical expenses previously paid by Salt Lake
City.

Judgment

and costs.

was entered for $22,676.55 plus interest

(R.2477).

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on damages or an
additure, (R.254) and defendant moved for a new trial on the
ground that the City's letter to the plaintiff should not
have been received in evidence (R.251).
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Both motions were

denied (R.264) and the City brought this appeal.

The plaintiff/

respondent's motion for a summary disposition of the appeal
was denied by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Lee Meyers is an employee of Salt Lake
City Parks Department

. He was on his way to work on May 31,

1983, during flooding which required rerouting of traffic
in downtown Salt Lake City, when the incident which gave rise
to this action occurred.

(R.373. ) Plaintiff's wife, Denice

Meyers, was a passenger in the car.
At the intersection of Sixth South and Main Streets ,
plaintiff attempted to make a left turn following several
other cars which had been permitted to do so.

At that point,

Officer J.R. Nelson ,who was directing traffic at the intersection,
came over to plaintiff's car, shouted at him, and began slamming
his fist on the hood and the side of the vehicle.
303, 379-383).

(R.300-

Plaintiff stopped his car, opened the door,

and began to get out to talk to the officer and to observe
what damage had been done.

Officer Nelson shouted at the

plaintiff to get back in the car, and as Meyers was sitting
back down, the officer put his hands on the car door and forced
it shut on plaintiff's left ankle, continuing to apply pressure
despite plaintiff's protests.

(R.303-304, 384-387).

He then

pulled plaintiff out of the car, and was in the process of
placing him under arrest when Officer Robyn Howell, who was
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also stationed at the intersection, intervened.

Howell pursuaded

Nelson not to arrest the plaintiff, and instructed plaintiff
to leave the intersection (R. 338-341, 388). These events
were observed by Denice Meyers and by Gary Clark, the driver
of the car immediately behind the plaintiff's at the time.
Both testified, as did Officer Howell.
After discussing the incident with a supervisor
of Officer Nelson at another location, plaintiff was directed
to the police department's Internal Affairs Unit where he
filed a formal complaint about Nelson's use of excessive force
against him,noting the injury to his left ankle (R. 182, 391).
He pointed out to Lt. Duncan the dents in his car caused by
Officer Nelson's fist, and the impression in the door caused
by forcing it against his leg.
Immediately afterwards, Mr. Meyers went to the emergency
room at L.D.S. Hospital where his ankle was observed to be
tender and swollen and bruises on his arm were noted (Plaintiff's
Exhibit, R. 188). The emergency room physician, Dr.
Ray Thomason, diagnosed the ankle injury as a sprain, and
instructed Meyers to return in three days.

When the injury

had not healed, the plaintiff was referred to Dr. Thomas Bauman,
an orthopedic surgeon, who performed further diagnostic tests
and identified the injury as a severe ligament disruption
and tear.

Plaintiff remained under Dr. Bauman's care for

the next two years.

Three separate surgeries were required to
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treat plaintiff's injuries, and after considerable pain and
limitation of his activities, he was left with a serious permanent
impairment.

(R. 4-66, 4-94).

Approximately one month after this incident and
the filing of the Internal Affairs Complaint, plaintiff received
by mail a letter on Salt Lake City Police Department stationary
signed by Lt. W.C. Duncan of the Internal Affairs Division,
under the name of Chief Bud Willoughby.
as Exhibit A in the appendix).

(The letter is reproduced

The letter refers to plaintiff's

complaint "charging Officer James R. Nelson with excessive
force . . . relative to an incident which occurred on 5/31/83
at 6th South and Main Street."

It informed plaintiff that

the investigation was completed and that
. . . the allegations contained
in your complaint was determined
to be "sustained" by the Officer's
division commander, Captain O.J. Peck.
"Sustained" means: The event
did occur and the officer is
guilty of the complaint alleged
or other infraction.
The plaintiff was thanked for bringing the matter to their
attention, and invited to contact Lt. Duncan if he had any
questions.
Later, this action was brought.

In answering plaintiff's

complaint, the City denied that Officer Nelson had acted negligently or had caused any injury to the plaintiff (R. 19-20).
Because of the apparrant inconsistency between the City's
letter to the plaintiff and its pleading, plaintiff's counsel
was permitted by the district court to examine the City's
file relating to its internal affairs investigation (R.108-

110).

Prior to trial, the City filed a motion in limine in

which the court was asked to restrain the plaintiff from "introducing evidence of or referring to the disposition of the
Internal Affairs investigation" on the ground that such information
was irrelevant and immaterial to the lawsuit (R. 227, 236).
In response to the motion in limine, and again during
trial, plaintiff offered the letter he received from the police
chief as well as two documents from the internal affairs file:
plaintiff's written complaint (R. 182)(Exhibit B) and a document
entitled "complaint disposition review" (R. 184)(Exhibit C ) .
The court ruled that the two documents from the police file
were inadmissible but that the letter could be received as
an admission of a party (R. 279-280).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The disputed letter is defined as non-hearsay

under the Rules of Evidence since it constitutes an admission
of a party, and is relevant because it concerns facts which
are in issue in this action.
2.

The City's remaining evidentiary objections

were raised for the first time in post rial

proceedings.

Those objections; first, that the letter discloses subsequent
remedial measures; second, that the letter is protected by
a statutory or common lawexecutive privilege, and third, that
the prejudicial impact of the letter outweighs its probative
value, are meritless anyway.
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3.

In addition to the letter, there is substantial,

uncontradicted evidence of the City's liability for the plaintiff's
injury.

Therefore, it if was error to receive the letter

in evidence, it was harmless error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE POLICE CHIEF'S LETTER TO THE
PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE AS AN ADMISSION
BY A PARTY ON A SUBJECT RELEVANT
TO THE ACTION.
The letter whose admissibility is the subject of
this appeal is a classic example of an extrajudicial statement
by a party which is not subject to hearsay objection under
Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Statements which are not hearsay.
A statement is not hearsay if
"k

">V

"k

(2) Admission by party opponent.
The statement is offered against
a party and is fa") his own
statement, either in his individual
or representative capacity, or
(B) a statement of which he has
manifested his adoption or belief
in its truth, or (C) a statement
by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning this
subject, or (D) a statement by
his agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of
nis agency or employment, made
during trie existence of the
relationship; or 0 D a statement
by a co-conspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
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The letter in issue was offered against a party,
the defendant Salt Lake City.

It was made by agents of Salt

Lake City, Chief of Police Willoughby and Lt. Duncan, during
the existence of their employment relationship.
has never

The City

contended that the subject matter of the letter

was outside the scope of the employment of its authors; the
chief of police is the city officer responsible for the entire
police department, and Lt. Duncan is the person to whom the
investigation

which is the subject of the letter

was assigned.

On the same ground, in a very similar case, the
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a memorandum reflecting the
results of an internal police department investigation of
an officer's culpability for a traffic accident should have
been received in evidence in a civil trial arising out of
the accident.

Rutherford v. State, 605 P.2d 16 (Alaksa 1979).

The Alaska Court held that as a memorandum prepared by agents
of the City authorized to investigate the accident it was admissible
as substantive evidence of the facts admitted, without regard
to whether the admissions were in the form of opinion or were
based on other than first hand knowledge, and without the
foundation or predicate ordinarily required for impeaching
evidence.
The only hearsay objection presently in issue is
one the City raises for the first time on appeal, that the
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trial court erred in admitting the letter without first determining that the declarant was unavailable.
is completely without merit.

This argument

If a written statement satisfies

the requirements of Rule 801(d), it is a "statement which
is not hearsay" and any hearsay objection is overcome without
regard to the availability of the declarant.

(Confusion may

arise since the Rules require a showing of unavailability
before the prior statement against interest of a non-party
is received under Rule 804(b)(4),

A party is ,of course,

available by virtue of its presence at trial).
The actual basis of the City's objection to the
letter at trial was that it is irrelevant and immaterial to
the issues of the case.
Rule 4-01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines relevant
evidence as follows:
Relevant evidence means evidence
having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
The letter in question, by its terms, relates to
"an incident which occurred on 5/31/83 at 6th South and Main
Street", and which led Lee Meyers to charge Officer Nelson
"with excessive force".

This action was filed because of

an incident on that date at that location, and the plaintiff's
claim is that Officer Nelson physically injured him through
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the use of unreasonable force.

The letter and lawsuit obviously

relate to the same subject matter, and any doubt is removedby
comparing the letter with the plaintiff's internal affairs
complaint (Exhibit B ) .
The critical admission in the letter is that the
complaint was "sustained" and that sustained means "the event
did occur."

In effect, the City, through its agents, said

that it investigated the charge made by Lee Meyers that certain
events occurred, including the use by an officer of "excessive
force", and that the City concluded that these events did
occur and the officer did use excessive force.
Whether or not Officer Nelson used excessive force
in his interactions with Lee Meyers is "a fact of consequence
to the determination of the action."

That the City admitted

he used excessive force is definitely evidence having a tendency
to make it more probable that he did.

The very basis for

what this Court has called "the age old common law exception
to the hearsay rule known as an admission of a party", State
v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah 1980), is the natural
presumption that a party's admission against its own interest
tends

to be reliable.
The City contends that its conclusion that Officer

Nelson was guilty of excessive force was based upon different
evidentiary standards than those which apply in a civil action
and that its use of the phrase "guilty of the complaint alleged
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or other infraction" means that Nelson might have been found
guilty of violating an administrative rule unrelated to the
elements of a tort action.
Even if these contentions had any bearing on the
relevancy of the letter, they are not accurate.

The complaint

disposition review sheet from the City's internal affairs
file establishes both the basis of the City's conclusions
and the evidentiary standard employed (R. 184, Exhibit C ) .
First, the form describes the four findings which
might be made as a result of an internal affairs investigation:
UNFOUNDED - The complaint, as reported, didn't occur.
EXONERATED - The event did occur as reported, but
the officer's actions were lawful
and reasonable.
NOT SUSTAINED - Facts do not support a conclusion
of guilt or innocence on the part
of the officer. Therefore, the
complaint is resolved in his favor.
SUSTAINED - The event did occur and the officer
is guilty of the complaint alleged or
other infraction.
It is noteworthy that before a complaint against
an officer is sustained, the Internal Affairs Department must
conclude both that the event complained of occurred and that
the conduct of the officer was not lawful and reasonable.
Furthermore, the evidence considered must preponderate against
the officer before a complaint will be sustained.
The comments of Division Commander Peck also establish
that the basis of the finding was the same conduct which
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was the subject of the lawsuit:

Nelson's use of unreasonable

force which caused an injury to the plaintiff.
Although the complaintant was
wrong in making the left turn
described, I feel the Officer
over reacted and used excessive
force. The available physical
evidence, i.e., bruises and discoloration of the complaintant's
skin and the dents and marks on the automobile are consistent with the
complaintant's allegations. All
witnesses, except Nelson, agreed
substantially on what took place
with the exception of Nelson calling the
complaintant a SOB. (R. 184)(Appendix C ) .
Neither the evidentiary standards nor the factual
findings which led to the July 1 letter are so different from
those employed in the tort action as to render the letter
irrelevant.
Most importantly, it should be recognized that it
is not the burden of one offering the extrajudicial statement
of a party opponent to establish the underlying reasons for
the admission.

Once the requirements of Rule 801 are satisfied

as to a statement which relates to the subject matter of the
lawsuit, the statement should be admitted.

The party who

made the statement is then free to explain the basis or the
context of the statement, or even to disavow it, through his
own testimony.

Michael v. Bauman, 76 N.M. 255, 413 P.2d 888

(1966).
As the Supreme Court of Hawaii said in reference
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to the identical evidentiary provision,
'The extrajudicial statements
of a party opponent, when offered
against the same, are universally
deemed admissible at trial as
substantive evidence of the fact
or facts stated.' [P]arty
admissions, unlike statements
against interest, need not have
been against the declarant's
interest when made, need not
be based on the declarant's personal
knowledge, may be in the form of an
opinion, and are admissible at
trial regardless of whether the
declarant is unavailable.'
Their free admissibility 'is
grounded upon the adversary theory
of litigation' rather than any
circumstantial indicia of reliability.
* * *

'A party can hardly object that
he had no opportunity to crossexamine himself or that he is
unworthy of credence save when
speaking under sanction of an
oath.' And if his earlier statement is not repeated accurately, 'he
now as opponent has the full
opportunity to put himself on
the stand and explain his former
assertion. ' 4 Wigmore, Evidence
§1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
(Citations omitted); Shea v. City and County of Honolulu,
692 P.2d 1158, 1165 (Hawaii 1985).
The City in this case had every opportunity to
explain its prior statement, both by calling witnesses, and
through argument.

(R. 283-285).
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Nothing more was required.

POINT 2
THE CITY'S REMAINING EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS WERE NOT
MADE AT TRIAL AND CANNOT BE
RAISED ON APPEAL.
In addition to challenging its relevance and materiality,
the City raises three grounds of error in the admission of
the July 1 letter; first, that the letter was evidence of
subsequent remedial measures within the meaning of Rule 40 7
of the Utah Rules of Evidence; second, that the letter is
protected by the official information privilege established
by Utah Code Anno.§78-24-8, and third, that if the letter
is relevant, its unfairly prejudicial impact substantially
outweighs its probative value within the meaning of Rule 403
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
None of these grounds for objection to the admissibility
of the letter were asserted by the City at trial.

The City's

motion in limine states no grounds (R.227) and its memorandum
deals exclusively with the question of relevance and materialability (R. 236). Similarly, in oral argument on the motion,
those grounds were not asserted and only hearsay, relevance
and materiality were discussed (R. 273-286).

The additional

grounds were raised for the first time in the City's motion
for a new trial (R. 251), and are asserted again on appeal.
In the case of Barson v. E.R. Squibb, 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984) the defendant drug manufacturer objected
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at trial to the receipt in evidence of package inserts published
after the date of the injury out of which the action arose.
At trial, the sole contention was that the prejudicial impact
of the documents outweighed their

probative value within

the meaning of former Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In

a motion for a new trial and on appeal

the company argued

that the documents were hearsay and should have been excluded
on that ground as well.

Declining to consider that claim

of error, this Court stated, as follows:
The burden is always on the party
objecting to make certain that the
record adequately preserves an
objection or argument for review
in the event of an appeal.
In order to preserve a contention
of error on appeal, the party
claiming error in admission of
evidence must raise the objection
to the trial court in clear and
concise terms and in a timely
fashion calculated to obtain a
ruling thereon. Where there was
no clear and definite objection
on the basis of hearsay, that
theory cannot now be raised on appeal.
Squibb did raise a hearsay
objection after judgment was
entered in the case. However
issues raised for the first time in
post-judgment motions are raised
too late to be reviewed on appeal.
Therefore, we are precluded
from addressing this assertion
of error on the merits.
Barson v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., supra, 682 P.2d at
837-838.
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This Court ought not to reach the merits of the
three objections raised for the first time after trial.
Nevertheless, each will be briefly addressed.
(1)

Subsequent remedial measures.

Rule 407 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence states, as follows:
When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection
with the event. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, control, or feasibility
of precautionary measures, if
if controverted, or impeachment.
By its terms, this rule has no application to the July 1
letter.

The letter contains no reference to a measure taken

after an event " . . .

which, if taken previously, would have

made the event less likely to occur."

It does not, for example,

inform Mr. Meyers that Officer Nelson was suspended for a
day as a result of his conduct.
Rule 407 "prohibits evidence of post-accident changes
that make things different or better than they were at the
time of an accident."

Patrick v. South Central Bell Tel.

Co., 641 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1980).
are referred to in the disputed letter.

No such changes
The rule does not

prohibit "competent evidence resulting from an internal investigation of a mishap", Westmorland v. CBS, In ., 601 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y 1984), which is what the plaintiff offered in this instance.

2.

Official Privilege.

Utah Code Ann, §78-24-8(5)

(Supp. 1986), the section relied upon by the City as the basis
of its claim for privilege, provides, as follows:
Privileged Communications. There
are particular relations in
which it is the policy of the law
to encourage confidence and to
preserve it inviolate. Therefore,
a person cannot be examined as
a witness in the following cases:
Vc

Vc -A"

(5) A public officer cannot be
examined as to communications
made to him in official confidence
when public interest would suffer
by the disclosure.
Lt. Duncan and Chief Willoughby were not examined
as witnesses about their internal investigation of the plaintiff's
injuries.

They mailed a letter to the plaintiff who offered

it in evidence himself.

This statutory provision has no application

whatsoever to the admissibility of the letter.
The City also cites cases which address the applicability of a common law "official information privilege"
to discovery requests for access to confidential executive
files, e.g., Martinelli v. District Court In and For City
Etc., 612 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1980); Denver Policemen's Protective
Ass'n. v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981).

These

decisions and the standards they express were fully considered
by the trial court in ruling on the plaintiff's pretrial
discovery motions requesting access to the internal Affairs
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file in the first instance (R. 49-93, 108-109).

The pre-trial

discovery order is not the subject of this appeal.

The official

information privilege can have no bearing on the admissibility
of the disputed letter since the exhibit was not obtained
through disclosure of confidential information in official
files.

Any privilege that might arguably apply to the results

of an official internal investigation was waived as to the
contents of the letter the City voluntarily mailed to the
plaintiff.
(c)

Rule 405.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

provides, as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time or needless presentation
of cummulative evidence.
The City contends that the disputed letter confused
the issues, misled

the jury ,and unfairly prejudiced the City's

defense because "the jury was never instructed that the determination made in the letter was not based upon negligence"or that
the determination was based upon "an entirely different
factual and legal standard than that which concerned the
tort case", and because the letter left it unclear whether
the conduct evaluated by the City was the same conduct involved
in the civil case.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 26).
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There is no merit to the City's argument that an
admission of a party is unfairly prejudicial unless the declarant
weighed the relevant evidence according to the standards
applicable in a civil trial before making the statement which
is offered.

If this were so, admissions of a party would

almost never come into evidence since people do not customarily
engage in something akin to the civil trial process before
making extra-judicial statements,

see, e.g., Walters v. Querry,

588 P.2d 702, 703 (1978), in which this court affirmed
the admissibility of a statement made by a party to an automobile
accident moments afterwards that "she felt like she was the
cause of the accident."
The City's suggestion that the July 1 letter might
have related to facts other than those which plaintiff attempted
to prove is simply not substantiated by the record.

As discussed

previously, the complaint review sheet describes exactly what
conduct the investigator dealt with, and demonstrated that
the facts were reviewed by the City under standards similar
to those employed in civil litigation.

(Appendix C ) .

All admissions by parties are prejudicial; they
are objectionable only if their unfairly prejudicial qualities
substantially outweigh their probative value.

As noted previously,

the City had the right to explain and even to contradict its
prior admission if it chose to, and was given the opportunity
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to do so.

Michael v. Bauman, supra, (R. 284-285).

The City

has not shown how Rule 403 was violated by receipt of the
letter.
POINT 3
ANY ERROR IN RECEIPT OF THE
LETTER WAS HARMLESS.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides
that
Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected . . .
This Court has consistently held that
. . . The fact alone that evidence
was erroniously admitted [is not]
sufficient to set aside a verdict
unless it has 'had a substantial
influence in bringing about the
verdict'.
Pearce v. Wistinson, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985).

Or, as

this Court has also said, error in the admission of evidence
. . . does not rise to the level
of prejudicial error unless there
is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury would have reached
a different result if the error
had not occurred.
Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380,
381 (Utah 1982).
There is no likelihood at all that the jury would
have reached a different verdict had it not been for admission
of the disputed letter.

The evidence that Officer Nelson
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slammed the car door on the plaintiff's ankle was actually
uncontradicted.

The plaintiff, his wife, and the driver of

the car behind him all described that event (R. 302-304, 384387, 502). Even Officer Nelson did not deny it, testifying
simply that he did not remember whether he closed the door
on plaintiff's foot, and therefore neither admitted nor denied
having done so (R. 334).
The City contends that the letter's effect on the
jury's decision is apparent from its finding of liability
despite evidence that the injury did not occur in the manner
plaintiff claimed and evidence that the whole incident was
plaintiff's fault.
In arguing

that the jury disregarded evidence that

the injury did not occur as alleged, the City has seriously
mischaracterized the record.

First, the City contends

1. The plaintiff's ankle injury
could not have been sustained by the
compression of a door on the ankle;
Rather, plaintiff Meyers' own physician
testified it must have been the result
of a twisting action. No twisting
action occurred at the scene.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27).

Dr. Thomas Bauman did, in fact,

testify that the type of sprain the plaintiff suffered typically
occurs as a result of "an inward twist or hyperplantar flexion
. . .

such as would occur

if your foot was forced markedly
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down into flexion . . . "(R. 487).
In his testimony, the plaintiff testified that he
sustained such a twisting injury when his foot was trapped
in the car door and demonstrated it to the jury:
I sat back down and I went to pull
my foot up, you know, to put it
in, you know and he caught it right
on the ankle part here, twisting my
foot and twisting — caught it right
in the door . . .
(R. 385-386).
JL.

J^

J-

Q.

And do you remember at what
angle your foot was caught
at that point?

A.

Yes. It was -- I can't
it now, but it was in a
I was trying to pull it
because I could feel it
hurting. I was pulling

twist
twisty —
out of there
start
up.

(R. 386).
Dr. Ray Thomason, the physician who treated the
plaintiff in the emergency room the morning of the injury,
gave the following explanation of the manner in which the
ankle sprain occurred:
Q.

(Mr. Hawkins) I do have one more
question, and that is, Doctor:
If the door is shutting with equal
pressure on both ankle bones on
a person who's sitting in the car
— and I'll represent to you
that Mr. Meyers has indicated, at
one time, he was sitting in the
— when that pressure was incurring,
how would that twisting of the
ankle have occurred?
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A.

It would be very simple. As a
matter of fact, if I wanted to
sprain your ankle, the easiest
way to do it would be to first,
stabilize it where it can't be
removed, and then move your
upper body one way or the other.
And that's how sprains, usually
occur. In other words, it's planted,
fixed in one position, and then
the -- the upper extremity as it
moves, causes the tear.

(R. 188, plaintiff's Exhibit

16, p. 21).

(Dr. Thomason was

unavailable as a witness at trial, and his deposition testimony
was published and read to the jury).
The only evidence was that the plaintiff's ankle
injury occurred when it was caught in the car door
31, 1983.

on May

Dr. Bauman and Dr. Thomason described the mechanism

of the injury in medical terms as did the plaintiff in layman's
terms.

While the City Attorney in examining the plaintiff's

witnesses continually attempted to elicit testimony that the
ankle injury could not have happened or did not happen in
this manner, there was no such testimony.
Secondly, the City inaccurately states in its brief
that
The medical records show plaintiff
Meyers severely twisted his ankle
while elk hunting. Later, on a deer
hunt, he also, apparently, injured
his ankle requiring medical attention.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27).
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The suggestion that Lee Meyers severely twisted
his ankle while elk hunting is false.

There is no reference

to any injury elk hunting in plaintiff's medical records which
make up the exhibit the City cites as the basis of this claim.
In his office notes of October 21 Dr. Bauman made
the following statement:
Mr. Meyers returns today because
he has been having increasing
pain in his left ankle . Most of the
pain is on the lateral aspect of the
ankle. He has been deer hunting and
this has aggravated it somewhat but
it started even prior to the deer
hunting.
(Plaintiff's exhibit 1, office notes of Salt Lake Clinic,
October 21, 1983).

This office note contains no reference

to any new injury while hunting and is the only reference
in the records to hunting.
Plaintiff testified that he went elk hunting shortly
before this visit with Dr. Bauman, that his ankle was very
sore at the time, and that he restricted his activity as a
result.
4-10).

However, he denied any fall or any new injury (R.
Dr. Bauman testified that Meyers reported no re-injury

while hunting (R. 475). Furthermore, the doctor testified
that his condition at that time of the October 21st visit
presented no evidence of a new injury:
Q.

Doctor, on that occassion did
you see any evidence by your
examination of some intervening accident or injury?
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A.

No. In fact, he was tender all
the way around where he had sprained
his ligaments, but I specifically
stated that he was without any
severe swelling or other
specific findings in that area.
So he had no great amount of
swelling or evidence of a new
injury at that time.

(R. 475).
While the City Attorney repeatedly raised the possibility
at trial that the plaintiff had sustained a new injury to
his ankle while deer hunting or elk hunting, there was never
any such evidence, and the uncontroverted evidence was to the
contrary.
Finally, the City argues that the prejudicial impact
of the letter is apparant because the jury found the City
99% negligent even though "the whole incident was caused by
plaintiff Meyer's refusal to obey the lawful directions of
a police officer".

(Brief of Appellant, p. 27).

The City simply begs the question.

Even Officer

Nelson admitted that in interacting with a citizen in Mr.
Meyers' position a police officer has an obligation to use
reasonable care to avoid injuring him (R. 335) and the City
has never contended otherwise.

The letter was offered as

evidence that Officer Nelson acted unreasonably in his actions
toward the plaintiff and injured him.

However, since the

other evidence on this question was contradicted, it is virtually
certain that the jury would have reached the same verdict
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without the letter.

In any event, the City has in no way

demonstrated that the letter had a substantial effect on the
outcome of the case.

The introduction of the letter, if it

was error, was harmless error.
CONCLUSION
This Court has held that the ruling of a trial court
as to the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed
unless it is shown

that the trial judge abused his discretion,

Terry v. Zions Coop Mercantile Institution, (605) P.2d 314,
332-323, 1979).

The City has failed to demonstrate that the

trial court abused its discretion by receiving the disputed
letter.
The City voluntarily mailed a letter to the plaintiff,
admitting that his allegations about the conduct of a City
police officer were true.

When the plaintiff filed a lawsuit

on account of that conduct, the City denied what it had previously
admitted.

The trial judge was entirely correct in ruling

that the letter should be received in evidence as an admission
by agents of Salt Lake City on a subject relevant to the lawsuit.
Even if the court erred in receiving the letter,
it could not have materially affected the jury's verdict since
the evidence on the question of the City's liability was essentially
uncontradicted.

The judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed.
DATED this^L^ day of September, 1986.

Timothy C. H<$dpt
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed this oL^

day of September, 1986, to the

following:
Greg R. Hawkins
Assistant City Attorney
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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-"BUD"WILLOUGHBY

^ CHIEF OF POLICE

450 SOUTH THIRD EAST
TELEPHONE 535-7222
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

July 1, 1983
Lee R. Meyers
885 East 575 North
Layton, Utah
84041
Re: I.A. Case #83/032
Dear Sir,
On 5/31/83, you filed a complaint with our Internal
Affairs Unit charging Officer James R. Nelson with excessive
force- Your complaint was relative to an incident which
occurred on 5/31/83, at 6th South and Main St.
This letter is to inform you that the investigation is
completed and the allegation contained in your complaint
was determined to be "Sustained" by the Officer's division
commander, Captain O.J. Peck.
"Sustained" means: The event did occur and the officer
is guilty of the complaint alleged or other infraction.
We thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.
If you have any questions concerning this investigation
please contact Lt. W.C. Duncan, during normal working hours.
Sincerely,
E.L. "Bud" willoughby
Chief of Police

J& l>.C/&>

W.C. Duncan
Lieutenant
Internal Affairs Division
Salt Lake City Police Department

WCD:lf
cc:

file

>-f\

APPENDIX B

CONPDENTW

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED M A T C - \ ' A 7
Salt Lake City Police Department INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION
Internal Affairs Unit
'
CITIZEN

COMPLAINT

AGAINST

POLICE

83/032

IA CASE #

CONDUCT

NOTARIZED:

OR

YES

SLCPD CASE #

ASSIGNED TO t T 3

NATURE OF COMPLAINT Excessive Force

(10)

•AGAINST

NELS0N

>

J R

- "

CAPTAIN NOTIFIED

DIVISION
g j

DATE OF THIS REPORT

snyaq

LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE

DATE

PECK

TIME ng-nn

Main & 6th $0Uth

XXX

NO
LA

-

WeSt

fi/?/fi3

TAKEN BY i t

DATF

PROCEDURE

5/31/83

n.mran

TIME

7:3

°

^

COMP LA INANT MEYERS, Lee
ADDRESS
R35 F 57R Nr laytnn, Utah
544/0445
PHONE # (H)
WITNESS
ADDRESS
PHONE.

(R)

ZIP CODE 84041
535/7706
City Cemetary

MEYERS, Denise
RfiS F 575 N/taytnn, lit
544/0445

DETAILS OF COMPLAINT:

^
«..
,
. , , « . *
* e*u e ^ M •
Comp attempting to make l e f t turn at 6th S and Mam.
Traffic was being controlled by Officer J.R. Nelson. Co^p says Officer Nelson
struck complainants car with his f i s t , cursed him, slamrred door on complainants
ankle, twisted his right arm behind him and arrested him. Complainant is
claiming damage to vehicle, damage to left leg and aright arm. No arrest made.
r

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON REVERSE OR ADDITIONAL SHEET
•COMPLAINANT: READ BEFORE SIGNING: I REALIZE BY SIGNING THIS COMPLAINT
THAT:
1, I AGREE TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO VERIFY THE ABOVE
INFORMATION,
2,

I REALIZE THAT IT IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE TO FALSIFY INFORMATION TO A
MEMBER OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
j
,

SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS
a? DAY OF
/ 2 ^ ,

_

„
J

v
-p
,

^ NOTARY

.

7-/T-

Zs-

COMMISSION FVPJRFS

1Q f ^

APPENDIX C

INTLR'WL AFFAIRS DIVISION

CO-PLAIW DISPOSITICN REVIpjf

CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED MATE?.'At.
•4HTERMAL APRAWS-WMSSTISATtOM - U

I HAVE PERSONALLY REVIEWED THE FACTS AND FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATOR IN THIS
CASE AND RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITION:
\

IUNFOUNDED - The complaint, as reported didn't occur.

(

|EXONERATED - T n e event did occur as reported, but the officer's actions were
lawful and reasonable.

[

I NOT SUSTAINED - Facts do not support a conclusion of guilt or innocence on
the part of the officer. Therefore, the complaint is resolved
in his favor.
XX SUSTAINED - The event did occur and the officer is guilty of the complaint
alleged or other infraction.

COf-MENTS: M t h o u a h t h e complainant was wrong in making the left turn described, i reex_
Officer over" reacted and used excessive force. The available physical evidence, i.
bruises and discoloration of the complainant's skin and the dents and marks on the
mobile/ are consistent with the complainant's allegations. All witnesses, except I
agreed substantially on what took placg/with the exception of Nelson calling the cc
lainant a SOB.
It is my recommendation that this complaint be sustained and that Officer Nels
receive two (2) days off without pay,/
/

6/27/83
DATE
I HAVE REVIEWED THE DICIPLINARY OR CORRECTIVE ACTION, IF ANY, TAKEN BY THE
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ACCUSED AND...
COMMENTS:
I concur with the recommendation of Captain Peck.
This officer has received many
praising letter's and because of his past work, I believe that two days off without
pat/, with the option to work the two days, is sufficient. Had he had problems in
the past, I would recommend more.

(p- £<7- F i ^
DATE

'DATE

BUREAU COMMANDER

CHIEF OF POLICE /

• ™%

